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Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and 
estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, over-
optimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project 
difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, 
unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually 
over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. 
Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather 
than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be 
irrelevant because “This time it’s different.” Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable 
optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive 
environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help 
gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success 
are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort 
information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is 
more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic 
alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to 
solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the 
deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a 
large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the 
planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and 
demonstrations can provide a reality check.  
Nomenclature 
AMCM = Advanced Missions Cost Model 
CEH = Cost Estimating Handbook 
CER = Cost Estimating Relationship 
LCC = Life Cycle Cost 
MOCM = Mission Operations Cost Model 
MSFC = Marshall Space Flight Center 
NAFCOM = NASA-Air Force Cost Model 
PCEC = Project Cost Estimating Capability 
PRICE = Parametric Review of Information for Costing and Evaluation  
WBS = Work Breakdown Structure  
I. Introduction 
HIS paper considers the very common, apparently unavoidable problem that project costs are significantly 
underestimated and that therefore projects usually overrun their budgets. Developing accurate cost estimates 
would be better than threatening that project managers must stay within their budgets or face cancellation. It is 
simply silly to pretend that the initial project cost estimate must be correct and can be set in stone forever by 
management. A project’s final cost is just one result of a continuing dynamic project process involving multiple 
conflicting stakeholders.  
It is often emphatically stated that a project must deliver its product within specification, on time, and in budget. 
However, the final project cost seems to be more an indirect and unpredictable result of the project process than a 
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controlling major goal. Project value and customer satisfaction do depend partly on the final project cost compared 
to budget, but very few successful projects stay within the original budget.  
How should project cost be estimated? The paper considers different cost estimation approaches, the well known 
reasons that cost estimates are too low, and a strongly suggested way to get better estimates.  
II. Different cost estimation approaches 
Sometimes cost estimates are based on a close analogy with a previous project or they are generated by expert 
judgment and group consensus without bothering with too much data and methodology. However, the two most 
frequently used cost estimation methods are parametric top-down and engineering bottom-up.  
Parametric top-down cost estimating methods include the Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM), the 
commercial PRICE-H space hardware cost model, and the NASA-Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM), which is 
being replaced by the Project Cost Estimating Capability (PCEC). They are based on one or several mathematical 
relationships called cost estimating relationships (CER’s) that are derived from the costs of similar hardware. The 
most important cost estimation parameter is system mass, followed by production quantity and the design heritage or 
number of previously developed similar systems. (Jones 2015-41) (Trivailo et al. 2012) (Guerra and Shishko 2000)  
Parametric top-down methods can be used early in project planning when only the top-level system requirements 
are available. The AMCM is especially easy to use, requiring only the estimation of a half dozen parameters that can 
be entered into a spreadsheet or online calculator to produce a cost estimate. The AMCM seems the best cost 
estimator for use during early broad system trade-offs and initial technology assessments. The Price-H cost model, 
NAFCOM, and the PCEC that is replacing it all require complex software, a trained cost estimator, and extensive 
interaction between the cost estimator and project management. They can be subjective and are strongly influenced 
by management expectations and strategy. Price-H, NAFCOM, and PCEC are more suitable for planning the final 
budget that project management will present and be held accountable for. (Jones 2015-041)  
The engineering bottom-up approach requires detailed estimates for the costs of hardware design, development, 
and test. Engineering cost estimating can only be done during the project design phase when the subsystem 
requirements are known. Detailed cost estimates require that the project deliverable be broken down into subsystems 
and the project tasks organized into work packages usually defined by a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). The 
bottom level cost estimates are provided by the subsystem engineers doing the design and planning to spend the 
budget. A major advantage of bottom-up detailed cost estimates is that they allow detailed cost monitoring later 
during the project. A major disadvantage is that they are complicated, inflexible, and expensive, so that they cannot 
adapt quickly to changes in requirements or designs. Changes are discouraged but seem inevitable. (Trivailo et al. 
2012)  
An engineering bottom-up estimate is much more convincing to managers and engineers than a parametric top-
down estimate because it can be broken down and checked in detail. Professional cost estimators strongly defend 
their top-down approach, claiming that the engineers’ bottom-up approach is usually more subjective and less 
accurate. Engineering cost estimates often assume the best case design process and tend to ignore administrative and 
program overhead, possible requirements changes, possible design errors and rework, etc., etc. Probably the best 
way to do cost estimation during the project life cycle would be to use the AMCM for quick early trade-offs, Price-
H or PCEC to develop the proposed project budget and monitor it at the top level during the project, and a modular 
updateable engineering bottom-up estimate for detailed project management and cost control.   
III. Why are initial cost estimates almost always too low?  
This section considers the project, psychological, political, and economic perspectives on cost underestimation 
and budget overruns.  
A. The project perspective 
All project based industries have the problem of cost overruns. The highway transportation industry identifies 
two fundamental causes of increasing cost estimates. First, the project scope is not understood at the time of 
planning and expands as new stakeholders add requirements. Second,  
“There is sometimes speculation that, to secure funding for projects, items may be purposefully excluded from initial 
project scopes and costs with the intention of adding them later. Questions about honesty or competence can threaten the 
credibility of the planning and programming process and that of the transportation agency.” (NCHRP, 2007)  
An engineering project text observes that cost overruns are the norm and mentions the same two problems, poor 
scope definition leading to requirements creep and low ball estimates to gain approval. It adds that project cost 
estimators can be too optimistic, assuming all will go well and no problems will occur. If unanticipated technical 
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difficulties arise due to poor design or bad test results, the result is higher than expected costs. (Venkataraman and 
Pinto 2008) 
The three reasons for overruns so far are: scope misunderstood or changed, deliberate low bid, and excessive 
optimism. A software researcher notes that inaccurate cost estimation is a major cause of software project failure, 
and identifies the same scope definition error and deliberate underbidding problems. Cost estimates are required 
before requirements are defined. New requirements are added but the original estimate cannot be changed. 
Management may simply reject a realistic conservative cost estimate and dictate a lower more aggressive one. The 
project may fail to use the best available cost estimating methods that use good historical cost calibration data. To 
limit scope problems, early estimates should include contingencies for requirements changes. To discourage the 
arbitrary downward adjustment of accurate estimates, cite historical data from similar projects that is harder to 
discount. (Jones, C. 2006) 
From the project perspective, the suggested reasons that initial cost estimates are too low are: 
1. Scope undefined, misunderstood, or changed 
2. Deliberate low bidding 
3. Excessive optimism 
4. Poor cost estimating methods and calibration data 
B. The psychological perspective 
The Nobel laureate, Daniel Kahneman, explored the idea that humans think in two different ways in his best 
selling 2011 book, Thinking, Fast and Slow. Fast thinking is intuitive, subconscious, using rules of thumb and 
common sense models. Slow thinking is logical, rational, deliberative, systematic. The lesson of Kahneman’s 
interesting, intelligent, and original 499 pages can be summed up in five words, “Not so fast! Think slow.” 
(Kahneman 2011)  
Kahneman spends ten pages to describe “one of the most instructive experiences of his professional life.” He 
was leading a group developing a textbook on rational decision making. While they were considering group decision 
making, he decided to collect individual estimates on how long their textbook project would take. Estimates varied 
from one and a half to two and a half years. But then he remembered that one group member, a textbook 
development expert, had been involved in many similar projects, so he asked him, “How long do similar projects 
usually take?” The surprising answer, “Seven to ten years, those that finish. 40% don’t.” Yet the expert stuck to his 
original roughly two year estimate for their current project, and so did all the group, and they pushed on. The project 
took eight years and the textbook deliverable was too late and never used.  
Kahneman learned three lessons. First, there are two different approaches to forecasting, which he calls the 
inside or project view and the outside or global view. Second, estimates are usually optimistic, too close to best case, 
which he calls the planning fallacy. And third, people push on when cancelling a project is the better choice.  
The textbook development expert first took an inside view when he estimated the project would take two years. 
He was completely immersed in the project and the group’s hopes and plans. When asked about similar projects, he 
then stepped back and took an outside view. But he did not apply the baseline statistics of the reference class to his 
current prediction, and neither did the rest of the group. In project cost estimation, engineering bottom-up estimates 
take an inside view and parametric top-down estimates take an outside global-historical view.  
Considering the forecast and the actual outcome, the textbook group’s and many other estimates appear 
delusional. The planning fallacy describes forecasts that are optimistic, unrealistically close to the best case, and do 
not consider the statistics of similar cases.  
1. The additional scope, underbidding, and cost data problems 
Kahneman in an aside also notes the familiar problems of scope changes and deliberate underbidding,  
“The optimism of planners and decision makers is not the only cause of overruns. Contractors of kitchen renovations and 
of weapon systems readily admit (though not to their clients) that they routinely make most of their profit on addition to 
the original plan. The failures of forecasting in these cases reflect the customers’ inability to imagine how much their 
wishes will escalate over time. They end up paying much more than they would if they had made a realistic plan and 
stuck to it.  
Errors in the initial budget are not always innocent. The authors of unrealistic plans are often driven by a desire to get the 
plan approved – either by their superiors or a client – supported by the knowledge that projects are rarely abandoned 
unfinished merely because of overruns in cost.” (Kahneman 2011, pp. 250-1) 
The psychological perspective emphasizes the cost underestimates are caused by optimism due to the inside view 
and the planning fallacy, but it also notes the importance of scope changes, deliberate underbidding, and the need for 
good cost reference data. The psychological and project perspectives produce the same four causes of project cost 
underestimation.  
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2. Persistent and incorrigible over-optimism 
Over-optimism usually persists beyond the planning phase of a project and into the execution phase. 
Psychological optimism produces two effects, low estimates and overconfidence that the low estimates will be met. 
Over-optimism is not only not cured by good cost models and data, it is encouraged!  
A simulation was conducted to investigate the persistence of the psychological optimism bias during a project by 
essentially eliminating technical problems and strategic underbidding. Competing project teams were provided with 
good planning models and techniques and accurate on-going project data. They were asked only to prepare, revise, 
and meet their estimates during the project. There was no need to bid for initial approval. Optimistic estimates not 
only persisted without the motivation of underbidding to gain project approval, they were actually encouraged by 
having good cost models and data. Good models and accurate data helped produce the illusion of certainty, 
predictability, and controllability. “Paradoxically, instead of providing realism and planning accuracy, the perceived 
ease of use and usefulness of planning tools reinforced a false sense of certainty.” (Kutsch et al. 2011)  
3. Reference class forecasting 
Kahneman mentions that the planning expert Bent (not Bert) Flyvbjerg endorsed the idea of using the outside 
view to cure the planning fallacy as “the single most important piece of advice regarding how to increase accuracy 
in forecasting.” The outside view can be implemented by using the statistics of similar cases in a method called 
reference class forecasting. (Kahneman 2011)  
C. The political-strategic-economic perspective 
The political-strategic-economic perspective of Bent Flyvbjerg emphasizes the self-serving calculations driving 
deliberate cost underestimation, but also acknowledges the importance of natural over-optimism and simple 
ignorance of actual past project costs. Reference class forecasting can mitigate ignorance, delusion, and deception in 
cost estimating. (Flyvbjerg 2006) (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009) 
Flyvbjerg’s analysis is briefly summarized. Budget overruns are often blamed on poor scope definition, project 
complexity, technical surprises, and the political conflicts of opposing stakeholders. These do increase costs, but 
why do project planners and cost estimators not anticipate them? Cost under estimation errors are due to three 
factors, technical errors, over-optimistic delusions, and deception by strategic manipulation of the cost estimate.  
1. Delusion and deception  
Kahneman’s planning fallacy is the tendency to make optimistic underestimates of cost, even while knowing that 
similar projects usually cost more. The risks of scope change, complexity, surprises, and conflicts are discounted or 
ignored during planning. Bottom-up planning, taking an inside view, and emphasizing the project’s uniqueness all 
contribute to the planning fallacy. Over-optimistic delusions can be reduced by a good learning environment, where 
similar problems are frequently solved and the proposed solutions quickly checked against reality.  
Deception occurs when the participants and stakeholders have different and conflicting interests and engage in 
political and strategic behavior, usually for economic advantage. Project advocates deliberately underestimate costs 
to increase the chance that their project will be chosen over its competitors. This defeats the project selection 
process, since the most deceptive rather than the most cost-beneficial projects can be selected. Strategic deception is 
encouraged by conflicting goals, asymmetric information, different risk preferences and time horizons, and unclear 
accountability. Deception can be reduced by openness, sharing information, and aligning incentives so that all 
stakeholders succeed or fail together.  
Delusion is personal and psychological while deception is organizational and political. Although delusion and 
deception have different causes, they are often intermingled and can be difficult to distinguish. Delusion and 
deception can combine in a negative synergism to create even lower cost underestimates. Large unique projects are 
especially prone to delusion and deception. (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009)  
2. Reference class forecasting 
When delusion and deception both occur, both can be mitigated by reference class forecasting, which 
implements the outside view. Reference class forecasting deliberately avoids the complex details of the inside view 
and simply focuses on the historical costs of similar projects. It is both much easier and much more accurate than 
detailed bottom-up cost estimation. (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009) Using past project cost data for cost prediction is used in 
engineering parametric cost estimation models such as AMCM, Price-H, NAFCOM, and PCEC.  
D. Summary: Why are initial cost estimates too low? 
The project, psychological, and political perspectives each emphasize one particular cause of project cost 
underestimates but they acknowledge the other possibilities. Together they provide a clear, comprehensive, and 
compelling view of why project cost estimates are usually too low.  
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1. Project: Scope unclear or changed, poor cost models and data, etc., etc.  
2. Psychological: Over-optimism, inside view, and planning fallacy (Kahneman) 
3. Political-strategic-economic: Deliberate underbidding (Flyvbjerg) 
Project problems, psychological over-optimism, and political strategic underbidding all cause cost estimates to 
be too low. Political underbidding is an intentional strategy; the cost estimate is reduced to increase the probability 
of gaining funding. In contrast, psychological optimism is subconscious. Project problems may be cited as excuses 
for a cost overrun actually due to over-optimism or deliberate underbidding.  
1. Project: Scope unclear or changed, poor cost models and data, etc., etc. 
Project organizations propose and conduct projects with a defined deliverable, schedule, and cost. If the project 
falls short, as most do, it seems obvious that the project is somehow at fault. And yet, when asked to explain an 
overrun, project management can usually plausibly blame external factors including scope change, poor cost 
estimating, project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, unforeseen events, and 
unpredictable bad luck. With so many plausible, handy excuses, a project really has no compelling need to meet its 
estimated final cost.  
Project scope does often change, but it does not always increase. Scope is often cut if costs rise. Cost estimating 
methods tend to be industry specific and subjectively influenced. Good historical cost data may be unavailable for 
the particular field and type of project being estimated. For instance, human space projects are few, significantly 
different from past efforts, have an unpredictable political and funding environment, and have a high degree of 
technical uncertainty. However, if cost estimates were inaccurate only due to estimating error, then overestimates 
should be as common as underestimates. However, unanticipated project problems such as difficulty, complexity, 
uncertainty, conflicts, unfavorable events, and bad luck all tend to increase cost over estimates.  
2. Psychological: Over-optimism, the inside view, and the planning fallacy (Kahneman) 
When project planning is over-optimistic, the probability and the negative impact of all the potential project 
problems are systematically underestimated. Best cast cost estimates are provided and they have nowhere to go but 
up. Over-optimism is a fundamental, subconscious, ineradicable, human perceptual error. It is especially infectious 
as a form of group-think. Over-optimism may be a necessary cognitive error for project advocates and innovators. 
Few radically new things would come into being if only low risk incremental developments were attempted. But do 
we want to fund the most over-optimistic project advocates or the most promising projects? A realistic assessment of 
project costs would be helpful.  
3. Political-strategic-economic: Deliberate underbidding (Flyvbjerg) 
Underestimating costs is a usual strategy to gain project approval and funding. Project advocates and managers, 
pushing to get their projects funded, over-promise what the project will do and understate how much it will cost.  
Strategic cost underestimation seems inevitable, a requirement of circumstances.  
“(T)he persistent existence over time, location, and project type of significant and widespread cost under-estimation is a 
sign that an equilibrium has been reached: Strong incentives and weak disincentives for underestimation may have taught 
project promoters what there is to learn, namely that cost underestimation pays off.” (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002, p. 286) 
The main reason that project advocates deliberately underestimate cost is simply to gain approval of a project 
they think is so necessary and beneficial that it would be worth its probably much higher ultimate cost. This defeats 
the project selection process, since the most deceptive rather than the most cost-beneficial projects could be selected. 
The project funders may not agree that the project would be worth its actual cost. If the project fails and is cancelled, 
the project advocates will be blamed for the cost underestimation as well as other faults.  
IV. More accurate cost estimates through reference class forecasting 
The best approach to avoid the delusions of optimism and the misrepresentations of strong advocacy is to use 
reference class forecasting. The cost of a large group of similar projects is used to estimate the cost of the current 
project. Reference class forecasting uses past project experience, measures of similarity, and cost estimator intuition 
in a structured process. The outside view taken by reference class forecasting is more objective, less manipulable, 
and less challengeable than the inside view of bottom up estimation.  
Flyvbjerg and others discussed the inaccuracy of forecasts and explained reference class forecasting in 2005. 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2005) Based on this work, the American Planning Association officially endorsed reference class 
forecasting. It made strong recommendation to use it combined with traditional methods as a way to improve 
accuracy, especially for non-routine projects. (Flyvbjerg 2006) The Association for the Advancement of Cost 
Engineering has recommended using reference class forecasting since 2006, and it is being used effectively. 
(Bordley 2014) 
Flyvbjerg emphasized that, “Reference class forecasting is based on theories of decision-making under 
uncertainty that won Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman the Nobel prize in economics in 2002.” (Flyvbjerg 
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2006) Errors in judgment are often systematic and predictable due to the decision-maker’s bias rather than random 
mistakes. Most surprisingly, these errors persist and are very difficult to correct, even when they are explained and 
the explanation is grasped and accepted. Understanding our own bias and cognitive illusions does not free us from 
them. (Flyvbjerg 2006) 
Reference class forecasting is an outside view method to help avoid both delusion and deception in cost 
estimation. The three basic steps are to identify the reference class of past projects, organize the data on the cost and 
other attributes of the projects, and predict the new project’s cost based on its similarity to the past projects. 
(Flyvbjerg 2006) (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009) (Bordley 2014) These steps are described in more detail. 
1. Define the reference class. The reference class should include all similar projects, unsuccessful as well as 
successful past projects, to reflect the actual distribution of possible outcomes. The reference class should be 
numerous enough to provide convincing data but narrow enough to be sufficiently similar to the projects to be 
estimated. Obtaining similar projects with relevant data can be difficult and time-consuming. 
2. Compile and analyze the cost and other relevant data on the reference class projects. Project data should 
include the major attributes related to cost, such as system mass, design generation, etc. The quality of the final cost 
estimates depends on the accuracy of the data used. The usual project issues that affect costs - scope changes, 
redesigns, uncertainty - may affect data validity. For each cost driver attribute, the numerical difference between the 
new project to be estimated and each past project is calculated. Relative weights are assigned to each attribute. A 
measure of similarity between the new project and each past project is then computed.  
3. The cost outcomes of each past project and its similarity measure with the new project are used to produce the 
new project cost estimate.  
Reference class forecasting is most helpful for non-routine projects, those different from recent local experience. 
The biases toward optimism and strategic misrepresentation tend to be large in planning new efforts. Getting data on 
a reference class of relevant past projects can be difficult, requiring search beyond the here and now, but is likely to 
be very beneficial.  
If forecasters are honestly trying to accurately predict the future, they should appreciate the need for the outside 
view and the potential of reference class forecasting. In this case, no one would to be against improved 
methodology.  
In many cases, cost underestimates are deliberate, the result of organizational responses to political-strategic-
economic pressures. Projects compete fiercely for approval and funds. There is no incentive for the individual 
project to provide higher, more realistic forecasts, but rather the opposite. Projects claim as low costs as possible to 
beat the competition. Reference class forecasting would still improve accuracy but as things are, no one is interested 
because the inaccuracy is deliberate. Practical organizational pressures prevent seeking a true and accurate view of 
the expected future.  
To establish use of reference class forecasting, cost estimators and project advocates should be held accountable 
for accurate forecasts and penalized for inaccurate ones. Cost estimates should be reviewed by independent analysts 
who would probably apply reference class forecasting to check estimates.   
V. Conclusion 
Correctly estimating project cost is apparently very difficult. Cost estimates are usually too low and there are 
frequent cost overruns. The final project cost is the result of a complex and somewhat unpredictable process, which 
can provide many excuses for the failure of a project to meet its budget. Inaccurate cost estimates are often blamed 
on bad cost models and inadequate cost data. If true, this should have led to serious work to improve the models, 
data, and resulting estimates, but the problem persists unabated. Clearly, cost estimators and project managers are 
not actively seeking more accurate cost estimates.  
The two most significant reasons that project cost is underestimated are delusion and deception. Project insiders 
are optimistic and provide best case cost estimates. Project advocates deliberately underestimate cost to secure 
project funding, knowing they won’t be held to their original estimates.  
Reference class forecasting uses past project cost data to counter honest optimism and manipulative 
underbidding. Cost models such as the AMCM that use past project costs and cost driver attributes to estimate new 
project cost work in a similar way.  
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